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A	“Post-Third	World	City”	or	a	neoliberal	“City	of	Exception”?	
Rio	de	Janeiro	in	the	Olympic	era	
	
Matthew	Aaron	Richmond	
Jeff	Garmany	
	
Abstract	
	
This	article	considers	processes	of	urban	development	within	the	
context	of	mega-event	preparations	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	We	begin	with	a	
brief	overview	of	these	development	processes,	highlighting	their	
connections	to	political	and	economic	change	in	recent	years.	
Proponents	of	these	mega-event-led	initiatives	argue	that	Rio	is	
undergoing	a	period	of	inclusive	growth	and	integration:	a	perspective	
we	call	here	a	‘Post-Third	World	City’	narrative	of	urban	renewal.	Critics,	
however,	contend	that	urban	officials	are	harnessing	mega-events	(e.g.,	
the	2014	World	Cup	and	the	2016	Olympic	Games)	to	push	forward	a	
host	of	socially	unjust	policies	benefitting	the	interests	of	capital	and	
marginalising	Rio’s	poor	and	working-class	residents	(i.e.,	the	“City	of	
Exception”	thesis,	Vainer,	2011).	In	this	article	we	explore	the	insights	of	
these	two	perspectives	and	consider	why	they	have	grown	popular	in	
recent	years.	Though	we	side	generally	with	the	City	of	Exception	thesis,	
we	argue	that	important	geographic	and	historical	particularities	must	
also	be	accounted	for.	Without	carefully	situating	analytical	perspectives	
empirically	–	and	in	particular,	cases	in	which	theoretical	models	are	
drawn	from	European	and	North	American	contexts		–	urban	
researchers	risk	concealing	much	more	than	they	reveal	in	analyses	of	
rapidly	developing	countries	like	Brazil.										
	
Key	words:	Mega-events,	urban	development,	Olympics,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	
Brazil,	favela	
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A	“Post-Third	World	City”	or	a	neoliberal	“City	of	Exception”?	
Rio	de	Janeiro	in	the	Olympic	era	
	
1)	Introduction	
	
There	 are	 few	 neighbourhoods	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 that	 reflect	 the	 city’s	
peculiar	development	history	over	 the	 last	 century	quite	 like	Morro	da	
Providência	(Providence	Hill).	Situated	near	the	Port	Zone	 in	the	centre	
of	the	city,	Providência,	as	it	is	known	today,	could	aptly	be	described	as	
Brazil’s	 oldest	 favela	 community	 (informal	 urban	 settlement).	 First	
occupied	 by	 veterans	 of	 Brazil’s	 Canudos	 War	 in	 1897,	 Providência	
earned	 the	 nickname	 “Favela	 Hill”	 from	 its	 original	 inhabitants.	 The	
nickname	 quickly	 caught	 on,	 and	 by	 the	 1920s,	 “favela”	 became	
synonymous	with	informal	housing	settlements	all	across	Rio	de	Janeiro	
(Perlman,	2010).	
	
While	 Providência	 is	 certainly	 not	 Rio’s	 largest	 or	 best	 known	 favela	
neighbourhood,	 the	 community	 continues	 to	 lie	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	
important	social	and	political	changes.	In	2010,	a	Police	Pacification	Unit	
(UPP)	 entered	 the	 favela	 to	 drive	 out	 the	 Comando	 Vermelho	 (Red	
Command)	 drug	 trafficking	 gang	 that	 had	 dominated	 Providência	 for	
decades.	 Although	militaristic	 in	 their	 planning	 and	 tactics,	 UPPs	 have	
been	 deployed	 in	 a	 host	 of	 Rio’s	 favelas	 since	 2008	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
establishing	a	permanent	police	presence	in	favelas	and	thus	putting	an	
end	 to	 the	 cycles	 of	 violence	 accompanying	 the	 State’s	 hitherto	
dominant	counter-insurgency	doctrine	(see	Cano	et	al.,	2012;	Alves	and	
Evanson,	2011).		
	
As	well	as	reducing	violence,	advocates	argue	that	these	public	security	
methods	 will	 create	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	 positive	 social	 and	
physical	 change	 in	 favelas.	 Indeed,	 several	 new	 policies	 have	 followed	
the	 UPP	 occupation	 of	 Providência.	 These	 include	UPP	 Social,	 a	 post-
Pacification	 service	 improvement	 and	 integration	 initiative,	 and	Morar	
Carioca	 (Carioca	 Living),	 an	 ambitious	 favela-upgrading	 programme	
intended	to	carry	out	major	public	works,	most	notably	the	 installation	
of	a	new	cable	car	and	funicular	train	to	improve	mobility	up	the	steep	
slopes.	Meanwhile,	 the	 largest	 urban	 regeneration	 project	 in	 Brazilian	
history,	 Porto	Maravilha	 (Marvellous	 Port),	 is	 turning	 the	 surrounding	
neighbourhood	from	a	semi-abandoned	industrial	zone	into	a	mixed-use	
business	and	residential	district	(Sanchez	and	Broudehoux,	2013).		
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Perspectives	 that	 emphasize	 the	 benefits	 of	 these	 changes	 constitute	
what	 we	 define	 in	 this	 article	 as	 a	 “Post-Third	 World	 City”	 narrative.	
According	 to	 this	 narrative,	 Rio’s	 current	 transformation	 is	 belatedly	
getting	to	grips	with	historic	problems	of	weak	urban	integration,	patchy	
public	 service	 provision,	 and	 endemic	 violence.	 This	 transformation,	
according	 to	 advocates,	 is	 being	 assisted	 by	 the	 city’s	 decision	 to	 host	
the	 2016	 Olympic	 Games,	 which	 have	 encouraged	 collaboration	 and	
investment	 from	 across	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 that	 might	 not	
otherwise	 have	 been	 forthcoming.	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 is	 not	 becoming	 a	
“First	World	City”,	but	 its	transformation	is	moving	the	city	beyond	the	
First/Third	World	dichotomy	 that	underpinned	 scholarly	 analyses	of	 its	
development	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	
Providência	 and	 the	 Port	 Zone	 meanwhile,	 for	 so	 long	 bywords	 for	
inequality	 and	 exclusion,	 are	 to	 become	 the	 most	 potent	 symbols	 of	
Rio’s	 reinvention	 as	 a	 more	 integrated,	 more	 peaceful,	 more	 modern	
city.	
	
By	 2015,	 however,	much	 of	 the	 optimism	 that	 once	 surrounded	 these	
reforms	has	dissipated.	As	in	other	favelas,	residents	of	Providência	have	
complained	of	abuses	by	UPP	officers,	and	drug	 traffickers	 continue	 to	
operate	 in	 the	 area	 (Granja,	 2010).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 infrastructure	
projects	 threaten	 to	 evict	 a	 large	 number	 of	 residents,	with	 estimates	
that	as	much	as	one	third	of	the	population	might	be	relocated	(Sanchez	
and	 Broudehoux,	 2013:	 137).	 To	 add	 insult	 to	 injury,	 many	 residents	
learned	 they	 were	 at	 risk	 of	 removal	 by	 returning	 to	 find	 the	 letters	
“SMH”	 (the	 acronym	 of	 the	 Secretaria	 Municipal	 de	 Habitação,	 or	
Municipal	Housing	Secretariat)	painted	on	their	outer	walls.	The	opacity	
and	inconsistency	of	the	authorities	have	made	it	all	but	impossible	for	
those	 affected	 to	 gain	 further	 information.	 And	 while	 the	 Porto	
Maravilha	website	argues	 the	project	“starts	 from	the	assumption	 that	
the	current	residents	will	remain	in	the	port	region”[i]	(Porto	Maravilha),	
this	is	unlikely	given	that	most	new	housing	in	the	port	area	is	targeted	
towards	high-income	groups	 (Sanchez	and	Broudehoux,	 2013:	143-48).	
Instead,	many	who	live	in	Providência	could	be	sent	to	the	distant	edge	
of	the	city	where	the	majority	of	new	low-income	housing	is	being	built.		
	
A	growing	body	of	critical	academic	 literature,	broadly	 following	Carlos	
Vainer’s	 influential	 “City	 of	 Exception”	 thesis	 (Vainer,	 2011),	 identifies	
such	effects	not	only	as	inevitable,	but	as	intended	outcomes	of	the	new	
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urban	 policies.	 Vainer	 and	 others	 argue	 that	 the	Olympic	 Games	 have	
created	 a	 “state	 of	 exception”	 (Agamben	 2005),	 permitting	 the	
circumvention	of	legal	protocol	and	citizen/human	rights	in	the	interests	
of	global	capital.	As	a	result,	they	claim,	the	urban	impacts	in	areas	like	
Providência	 will	 not	 be	 integration	 –	 as	 promised	 by	 the	 Post	 Third-
World	 City	 narrative	 –	 but	 on	 the	 contrary	 securitisation	 and	 social	
cleansing	of	valuable	and	strategically	important	areas,	creating	a	City	of	
Exception	urban	landscape.	
	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 critically	 interrogate	 and	 compare	 the	
Post-Third	 World	 City	 narrative	 and	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 thesis.	 The	
former	 argues	 that	 Rio	 is	 undergoing	 a	 period	 of	 inclusive	 growth	 and	
integration	(led	by	mega-event	initiatives	and	urban	renewal),	while	the	
latter	contends	that	urban	officials	are	harnessing	mega-events	to	push	
forward	 socially	 unjust	 policies	 that	 further	marginalize	 Rio’s	 poor	 and	
working-class	residents.	 It	should	be	noted	that	these	two	perspectives	
are	 not	 directly	 analogous:	 the	 Post-Third	 World	 City	 narrative	 is	
essentially	 a	 government	 discourse	with	 a	 degree	of	 public	 resonance,	
while	the	City	of	Exception	thesis	is	an	academic	critique	(which	has	also	
influenced	the	tactics	and	rhetoric	of	oppositional	social	movements).		
	
Nonetheless	 we	 believe	 the	 exercise	 is	 a	 useful	 one	 that	 furnishes	
valuable	 analytical	 insights.	 Firstly,	 the	 two	perspectives	 constitute	 the	
primary	 ‘big	 picture’	 accounts	 that	 have	 sought	 to	 explain	 –	 and	 that	
have	 shaped	 public	 debates	 about	 –	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 current	
transformation,	 making	 them	 important	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 Secondly,	
both	acknowledge	Rio’s	current	“Olympic	era”	as	a	watershed	moment,	
yet	 diverge	 significantly	 in	 how	 they	 interpret	 the	 effects	 of	 these	
changes.	As	 such,	 they	prefigure	 radically	different	 futures	 for	 the	city.	
Thirdly,	the	comparison	opens	into	wider	academic	debates,	both	about	
the	 relationship	 between	 mega-events	 and	 urban	 transformation	
(Poynter	 and	 Viehoff,	 forthcoming),	 and	 about	 the	 applicability	 of	
theoretical	 frameworks	 developed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 urban	 Global	
North	to	analysis	of	cities	 in	the	Global	South	(Roy,	2009;	2011;	Parnell	
and	 Robinson,	 2012;	 Robinson,	 2011).	 We	 believe	 that	 pursuing	 this	
analysis	 can	 therefore	 help	 to	 untangle	 the	 complex	 interactions	
between	State,	market,	social	groupings	and	urban	space	in	the	twenty-
first	 century,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 like	 Brazil	 that	 are	 developing	
rapidly.	
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We	begin	the	article	by	providing	general	background	and	defining	what	
we	see	as	a	loose	but	generally	coherent	“City	Project”	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	
before	 outlining	 the	 historical	 narrative,	 political	 language	 and	 policy	
influences	that	combine	to	 form	the	Post-Third	World	City	agenda.	We	
then	go	on	to	review	the	emergent	literature	critiquing	the	City	Project,	
with	 its	emphasis	on	neoliberal	economic	strategies,	competitive	urban	
governance,	 and	 the	 catalytic	 role	 of	 global	 mega-events.	 The	 second	
half	of	the	article	offers	an	evaluation	of	these	two	perspectives	and	an	
elaboration	 of	 several	 important	 tensions	 and	 omissions	 that	 emerge	
from	this.	While	we	broadly	side	with	the	City	of	Exception	critique,	we	
argue	 that	 it	 fails	 to	 fully	 account	 for	 current	 processes	 of	
transformation	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	To	achieve	this	we	argue	that	three	key	
factors	must	also	be	taken	into	account:	(1)	Elements	of	both	complexity	
and	continuity	within	the	Brazilian	State;	(2)	The	uneven	geographies	of	
urban	 policy	 impacts;	 and	 (3)	 Long-term	 socio-spatial	 trends	 that	 are	
unfolding	independently	of	the	City	Project.	
	
2)	A	“City	Project”?	
	
The	 new	 generation	 of	 urban	 policies,	 including	 those	 intersecting	 in	
Providência,	 have	 appeared	 at	 a	 particular	 historical	 conjuncture.	 In	
2003	 Brazil	 emerged	 from	 recession	 and	 began	 a	 period	 of	 sustained	
growth,	 bringing	 an	 end	 to	 more	 than	 two	 decades	 of	 economic	
stagnation	 and	 instability.	 For	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 which	 had	 fallen	 into	
relative	 decline	 since	 the	 1960s	 –	 losing	 its	 capital	 city	 functions	 to	
Brasília	and	falling	further	behind	São	Paulo	as	a	centre	of	business	and	
finance	 –	 the	 turnaround	 was	 even	 more	 pronounced	 (Urani	 and	
Gambiagi,	 2011).	 The	 city	 began	 to	 attract	 new	 national	 and	
international	business	investment	as	its	tourism,	retail	and	construction	
sectors	 boomed.	 This	 was	 further	 bolstered	 by	 the	 discovery	 of	 large	
offshore	oil	fields	in	2006.	Falling	unemployment	levels,	combined	with	
federal	income-supporting	policies	like	the	minimum	wage	and	the	Bolsa	
Família	conditional	cash	transfer	system,	led	to	a	marked	fall	in	poverty	
during	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 century,	 including	 in	 the	 city’s	 favelas	
(Rodrigues,	2013).	
	
In	the	political	arena,	Rio	also	passed	a	major	watershed	in	2008	when	
Eduardo	 Paes	 was	 elected	 Mayor	 on	 the	 ticket	 of	 the	 centre-right	
Brazilian	Democratic	Movement	Party	(PMDB).	Another	PMDB	member,	
Sérgio	 Cabral,	 had	 been	 in	 office	 since	 2006	 as	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 State	
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Governor,	and	the	party	was	in	coalition	with	then	President	Inácio	‘Lula’	
da	Silva’s	 leftist	Workers	Party	(PT)	at	the	federal	 level	(and	remains	so	
since	 the	 election	 of	 Lula’s	 successor	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 in	 2010).	 As	 a	
result,	Rio’s	three	tiers	of	government	came	into	alignment	for	the	first	
time	 since	 the	 return	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 1980s,	with	 each	 holding	 a	
strong	 political	mandate.	 In	 October	 2009,	 less	 than	 a	 year	 after	 Paes	
took	office,	Rio	won	its	bid	to	host	the	2016	Olympic	Games,	with	strong	
backing	from	both	parties.	
	
The	 successful	 Olympic	 bid	 provided	 extra	 impetus,	 resources	 and	 co-
ordination	 to	policies	already	being	 implemented	at	different	 levels,	as	
well	as	permitting	the	development	of	entirely	new	ones.	These	policies	
cover	 the	 areas	 of	 housing,	 infrastructure,	 transport	 and	 security,	 and	
include	those	already	mentioned	as	present	in	and	around	Providência:	
the	UPPs,	UPP	Social,	Morar	Carioca	and	Porto	Maravilha.	There	are	also	
major	 new	 transport	 policies,	 like	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 light-rail	 system	
covering	 the	 port	 and	 city	 centre,	 a	 Bus	 Rapid	 Transit	 (BRT)	 network	
focussed	on	the	west	of	the	city,	and	an	extension	of	the	city	metro,	also	
to	 the	west.	Significant	 federal	 infrastructure	and	housing	programmes	
such	 as	 the	 Programa	 de	 Aceleração	 do	 Crescimento	 (Growth	
Acceleration	Programme,	PAC)	and	Minha	Casa	Minha	Vida	 (My	House	
My	Life,	MCMV)	are	being	carried	out	on	a	large	scale	in	particular	zones	
of	 the	 city.	 There	 have	 also	 been	 major	 redevelopments	 of	 the	
Maracanã	football	stadium,	which	hosted	the	2014	World	Cup	final,	and	
the	Autódromo	Nelson	Piquet	in	Barra	da	Tijuca,	which	will	be	the	site	of	
the	future	Olympic	Park	(please	see	Figure	1).	
	
(Figure	1	about	here.)	
	
The	 appearance	 of	 such	 an	 array	 of	 new	 policies	 and	 projects	 in	 a	
relatively	 short	 period	 of	 time	 has	 led	 many	 to	 see	 the	 interventions	
collectively	 as	 part	 of	 a	wider	 strategy	 to	 transform	 the	 city:	what	 the	
Comitê	Popular	da	Copa	e	Olimpíadas	(Popular	Committee	of	the	World	
Cup	 and	 Olympics)	 describes	 as	 an	 Olympics-driven	 “City	 Project”	
(Comitê	Popular,	2013).	While	it	is	admittedly	problematic	to	lump	all	of	
these	 policies	 together	 as	 a	 single	 initiative	 –	 for	 example,	 some	were	
launched	before	Rio	won	the	Olympic	bid	and	others	are	only	tenuously	
connected	 to	Olympic	 development	 [ii]	 –	 there	 are	 several	 factors,	we	
feel,	 that	give	 these	various	 interventions	a	strong	degree	of	unity	and	
coherence.		
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First,	 although	 not	 all	 of	 these	 policies	 have	 been	 formulated	 or	
implemented	 in	 co-ordination	 with	 the	 others,	 there	 is	 a	 degree	 of	
institutional	 density	 and	 overlap	 that	 ensures	 that	 none	 is	 entirely	
separate	 from	 the	 rest.	 Second,	 these	 individual	 interventions	 have	
become	 increasingly	 focussed	 on	 delivering	 the	mega-events.	 This	 has	
caused	 strategic	 priorities	 to	 shift,	 with	 some	 programmes	 being	
accelerated,	others	being	shelved	and	many	forced	to	co-ordinate	their	
activities	 more	 intensely.	 And	 finally,	 perhaps	 the	 most	 significant	
reason	for	grouping	all	of	these	initiatives	under	the	City	Project	banner	
relates	 to	 their	 political	 trajectories:	 to	 justify	 these	 different	 projects,	
Rio’s	three	tiers	of	government	have	mobilized	a	more-or-less	 identical	
discourse	about	the	city’s	history,	its	current	problems,	and	the	solutions	
that	are	 required.	This	shared	narrative	has	provided	both	 the	glue	 for	
Rio’s	political	alliance	and	the	guiding	principles	that	can	be	seen	in	the	
design	of	 the	policies	 themselves.	 In	 the	next	 section	we	 focus	 on	 the	
origins	and	development	of	this	narrative,	and	then	move	on	to	consider	
a	series	of	recent	critiques	that	have	been	made	against	the	City	Project	
and	its	urban	and	social	impacts.		
	
3)	The	“Post-Third	World	City”	narrative	
	
While	 the	 Post-Third	 World	 City	 narrative	 has	 essentially	 been	 a	
government	 discourse,	 it	 also	 overlaps	 with	 some	 more	 popular	
interpretations	about	changes	needed	to	address	security,	housing,	and	
transport	challenges	in	the	city.	In	order	to	understand	its	initial	political	
strength,	it	is	therefore	necessary	to	situate	the	historical	moment	of	the	
mid-	to	late-2000s	in	the	broader	context	of	Rio’s	modern	history.	Both	
the	 diagnosis	 and	 prescription	 it	 offered	 for	 the	 city	 relate	 to	 the	
enduring	physical	and	social	legacies	of	two	earlier	and	deeply	formative	
historical	 periods.	 During	 both,	 Rio	 was	 seen	 as	 paradigmatic	 of	
problems	 emerging	 in	 cities	 across	 the	 Global	 South,	 or	 the	 “Third	
World”,	as	it	was	commonly	referred	to	in	the	language	of	the	time,	and	
as	 contrasting	 sharply	 with	 conditions	 found	 in	 the	 so-called	 “First	
World”.	
	
The	 first	of	 these	periods	was	the	era	of	 rapid	urbanisation,	peaking	 in	
the	1950s	when	Rio’s	population	grew	at	an	average	rate	of	over	4%	per	
year	(Perlman,	2010:	55).	Accelerating	rural-urban	migration	along	with	
endogenous	 population	 growth	 overwhelmed	 the	 public	 authorities,	
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which	 were	 unable	 to	 provide	 housing,	 infrastructure	 or	 services	
(including	 transport	 and	 policing)	 for	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 population.	
Unable	 to	gain	access	 to	 the	 formal	housing	market,	much	of	 this	new	
population	settled	in	favelas,	which	had	a	population	growth	rate	of	10%	
per	annum	during	 the	 same	decade	 (ibid.),	 and	peripheral	 semi-formal	
subdivisions.	Academics	at	the	time	theorized	the	“over-urbanisation”	of	
cities	across	Latin	America	and	the	Third	World,	and	the	economic,	social	
and	cultural	“marginality”	of	residents	of	informal	areas	(Perlman,	2010:	
147-64).	 Such	 ideas	 found	 political	 expression	 in	 favela	 removal	
campaigns	carried	out	on	a	massive	scale	 in	Rio	and	other	Third	World	
cities	during	the	1960s	and	‘70s.	
	
The	second	key	period	was	the	era	of	economic	turmoil	during	the	1980s	
and	 ‘90s.	 During	 this	 time	 visible	 signs	 of	 urban	 dislocation	 became	
pervasive,	 including	 the	 degradation	 of	 public	 infrastructure	 and	
industrial	 areas	 like	 the	 Port	 Zone,	 and	 growing	 homelessness,	
unemployment,	 and	 informality	 (Gilbert,	 1994).	 It	 also	 saw	 the	
emergence	of	heavily	armed	gangs	who	monopolized	the	city’s	growing	
cocaine	trade	and	established	de	facto	control	over	many	of	its	favelas.	
As	 rival	 factions	 competed	 for	 territory	 and	 Rio’s	 police	 adopted	
military-style	 tactics	 for	 combating	 them,	 many	 urban	 boundaries	
became	effectively	militarized.	This	included	wealthy	areas,	which	were	
increasingly	 fortified	 behind	 gates	 guarded	 by	 private	 security	 firms	
(Caldeira,	 2000).	Academic	and	popular	 commentators	 interpreted	 this	
as	 a	 process	 of	 urban	 fragmentation,	with	 Rio	 described	 as	 a	 “divided	
city”	(Ventura,	1994)	whose	favelas	were	controlled	by	“parallel	powers”	
(Leeds,	 1996).	 These	 processes	 certainly	 bore	 greater	 resemblance	 to	
contemporary	 trends	 in	 First	 World	 cities,	 such	 as	 deindustrialisation	
and	rising	inequality	and	crime.	However,	both	in	the	underlying	causes	
of	 its	 problems	 (eg.	 debt	 crises,	 uncontrolled	 inflation,	 institutional	
weakness),	 and	 in	 the	 extremity	 of	 its	 symptoms,	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 once	
again	 became	 a	 paradigmatic	 case	 of	 issues	 affecting	 the	 cities	 of	 the	
Third	World	more	generally.	
	
3a)	Post-Third	World	discourses	and	policy	influences	
	
As	can	be	seen	in	the	discourses	surrounding	the	new	urban	policies,	the	
City	 Project	 claims	 to	 respond	 to	 legacies	 of	 rapid	 urbanisation	 and	
urban	fragmentation,	primarily	by	promoting	integration.[iii]	The	policies	
targeted	at	favelas,	namely	the	UPPs,	UPP	Social	and	Morar	Carioca,	are	
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all	 presented	 as	 means	 for	 bringing	 about	 the	 physical,	 social	 and	
institutional	 integration	of	 favelas	with	 formal	areas.	For	example,	UPP	
Social’s	website	states	that	 its	objectives	are	to	“promote	urban,	social	
and	economic	development	 in	the	(pacified)	territories;	and	to	execute	
the	full	integration	of	these	areas	with	the	city	as	a	whole”	(UPP	Social).	
Morar	Carioca,	meanwhile,	is	described	as	a	“social	revolution”	that	will	
“re-urbanize	 and	 socially	 integrate	 all	 the	 city’s	 communities,	 until	 the	
year	 of	 2020	 [sic]”	 (Morar	 Carioca).	 The	major	 transport	 interventions	
like	 the	BRT,	meanwhile,	are	conceived	as	means	 for	 integrating	 larger	
areas	 of	 the	 city	 to	 one	 another:	 “The	 (BRT)	 express	 corridors	 [.…]	
together	with	the	light	rail	and	other	already	existing	means	of	transport	
will	 compose	 a	 new	 transport	 fabric	 interconnecting	 all	 the	 regions	 of	
the	Olympic	City”[iv]	(Cidade	Olímpica).	
	
These	 different	 processes	 of	 integration	 are,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
presented	as	being	catalysts	for	modernisation,	whether	this	is	referring	
simply	to	urban	infrastructure	or	to	the	social	and	cultural	life	of	the	city	
more	 generally.	 This	 is	 particularly	 clear	 in	 the	 claims	made	 for	 Porto	
Maravilha.	 The	Porto	Novo	 consortium	 that	 is	 carrying	 out	 the	project	
argues	the	following:	
	
Returning	 a	 historical	 treasure	 to	 Rio,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	
integrating	 areas	 with	 great	 housing,	 cultural	 and	 economic	
potential,	 which	 will	 be	 transformed	 into	 an	 example	 of	
modernity	 [….]	 The	 revitalization	 of	 the	 port	 area	 in	 Rio	 de	
Janeiro	will	reintegrate	it	with	the	city	center	as	an	example	of	
sustainable	urban	development	and	productive	social	inclusion	
(Porto	Maravilha).	
	
The	 modernising	 discourse	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 way	 different	 policies	 are	
presented	 as	 embodying	 ‘new	 approaches’	 to	 old	 and	 seemingly	
intractable	 problems.	Many	 of	 these	 have	 been	 adapted	 from	 policies	
developed	elsewhere.	For	example,	Porto	Maravilha	has	clear	echoes	of	
waterside	redevelopment	strategies	used	by	many	European	and	North	
American	cities	(Gaffney,	2013:	10;	Lehrer	and	Laidley,	2008).	The	most	
notable	 example	 in	 Rio’s	 case	 is	 the	 “Barcelona	 model”	 of	 using	 the	
Olympics	 to	 regenerate	 run-down,	 post-industrial	 areas.	 As	 has	 been	
widely	 noted,	 Catalan	 consultants	 promoting	 this	 model	 have	 been	
involved	in	Rio’s	history	of	strategic	planning	and	mega-events	bids	since	
the	early	1990s	(Vainer,	2009;	Sanchez	and	Broudehoux,	2013:	133-34).	
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The	 BRT	 system,	 meanwhile,	 builds	 on	 a	 model	 developed	 in	 South	
America	 itself:	 first	 in	 the	 southern	 Brazilian	 city	 of	 Curitiba	 and	 then	
significantly	 scaled	 up	 in	 Bogotá,	 Colombia	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
Transmilenio	 system	 in	 2000	 (Peñalosa,	 2014).	 Though	 Rio’s	 unique	
geography	and	urban	 landscape	share	 few	commonalities	with	cities	 in	
the	 Global	 North,	 Olympic	 planners	 appear	 to	 be	 drawing	 on	 past	
development	models	 in	hopes	of	achieving	a	similar	transport	 legacy	in	
Rio	(Kassens-Noor,	2013).		
	
The	favela-focussed	policies	also	reveal	an	eclectic	mix	of	influences	and	
are	similarly	marketed	on	the	basis	of	being	“innovative”.	For	example,	
Morar	 Carioca	 builds	 upon	 the	 achievements	 of	 Rio’s	 Favela	 Bairro	
upgrading	 programme	 of	 the	 1990s,	 though	 supposedly	 with	 greater	
sensitivity	 to	 specific	 local	 conditions	 through	 participatory	 planning	
processes	 and	 the	 favouring	 of	 architectural	 proposals	 that	 respond	
creatively	to	local	infrastructure	and	mobility	challenges.	An	example	of	
the	 latter	 is	 the	 use	 of	 cable	 cars	 like	 the	 one	 being	 installed	 in	
Providência,	 which	 arrived	 in	 Rio	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 visit	 made	 by	
Governor	 Cabral	 to	 Colombia	 in	 2007	 (Freeman,	 2012).	 In	 the	 city	 of	
Medellín	 the	 Metrocable	 system	 had	 been	 installed	 in	 a	 historically	
excluded	 informal	 settlement	 under	 the	 administration	 of	 reformist	
Mayor	Sérgio	Fajardo.	The	prior	military	incursion	that	had	“reclaimed”	
this	 territory	 from	guerrilla	 forces	and	 the	city’s	 subsequent	“return	 to	
legality”	 policing	 programme	 were	 also	 key	 inspirations	 for	 the	 UPPs	
(Gutierrez	et	al.,	2013),	although	the	latter	also	built	on	Rio’s	own	Group	
Policing	 in	 Special	 Areas	 (GPAE)	 programme	 which	 was	 piloted	 in	 the	
early	2000s	(Melício	et	al.,	2012).		
	
To	sum	up,	the	Post-Third	World	City	agenda	is	a	term	that	we	employ	in	
this	 article	 to	 describe	 an	 assemblage	 of	 policies	 and	 accompanying	
discourses	 constructed	 around	 a	 particular	 historical	 narrative.	
Specifically,	the	City	Project	is	presented	as	an	attempt	to	overcome	the	
negative	 social	 and	 physical	 legacies	 of	 rapid	 urbanisation	 and	 urban	
fragmentation,	which,	it	suggests,	are	the	fundamental	obstacles	the	city	
currently	 faces.	 It	 proposes	 to	 do	 so	 through	 innovative	 and	 locally	
sensitive	 policies	 that	 simultaneously	 upgrade	 and	 integrate	 different	
urban	 territories,	with	 specific	 (though	 not	 exclusive)	 emphasis	 on	 the	
relationship	between	favelas	and	formal	areas.	Those	innovative	policies	
are	 frequently	 borrowed	 from	other	 contexts	where	 similar	 conditions	
or	problems	are	deemed	to	prevail,	or	where	it	 is	believed	that	lessons	
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and	models	can	be	effectively	adapted	to	the	Rio	context.	The	presence	
of	 policy	 influences	 from	 ‘Northern’	 (i.e.,	 American	 and	 European)	
contexts	 reinforces	 the	argument	 that	 the	City	Project	 is	collapsing	 the	
old	distinction	between	‘First’	and	‘Third	World’	cities	as	Rio	de	Janeiro	
enters	a	new	modern	era.		
	
4)	Neoliberal	urban	governance,	mega-events	and	the	City	of	Exception	
thesis	
	
It	 is	a	 testament	 to	 the	descriptive	power	of	 the	Post-Third	World	City	
narrative	 that	 it	 achieved	 a	 kind	 of	 ideological	 hegemony	 between	 its	
initial	 development	 in	 years	 2007-09,	 and	 the	 explosion	 of	 opposition	
from	 community	 and	broader	 social	movements	 in	 2013.	Nonetheless,	
over	this	period	a	counter-narrative	did	emerge	that	began	to	tell	quite	
a	 different	 story	 about	 both	 the	 origins	 and	 long-term	 impacts	 of	 the	
City	 Project.	 This	 set	 of	 ideas,	which	 can	 broadly	 be	 called	 the	 City	 of	
Exception	thesis,	is	mainly	found	in	academic	writing.[v]	However,	it	has	
also	percolated	 into	the	rhetoric	of	social	movements	and	social	media	
campaigning	against	mega-event	policies	 (eg.	Comitê	Popular	2013).	 In	
this	 sense,	 although	 it	 is	 distinguished	 from	 the	 Post-Third	World	 City	
narrative	 by	 both	 its	 greater	 intellectual	 depth	 and	 distance	 from	
government,	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 thesis	 deserves	 to	 be	 seen	 as	
exercising	influence	beyond	academic	debates.		
	
The	 theoretical	 co-ordinates	 of	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 thesis	 are	mainly	
drawn	 from	 critical	 Marxist	 geography,	 though	 with	 some	 interesting	
departures	specific	 to	the	Rio	context.	Thus,	 for	Vainer	and	others,	 the	
long	period	of	urban	crisis	during	 the	decades	of	 the	1980s	and	 ‘90s	 is	
conceived	as	a	process	of	disinvestment,	with	global	capital	shunning	Rio	
in	 favour	 of	 other	more	 lucrative	 territories.[vi]	 This	 created	 a	 growing	
“rent	gap”	(Smith,	1979)	between	potential	and	realized	land	uses	in	the	
city	 as	 a	 whole,	 and	 in	 some	 hard-hit	 areas	 like	 the	 Port	 Zone	 in	
particular.	As	a	result,	when	economic	prospects	improved	in	the	2000s,	
capital	began	to	return	to	the	city,	seeking	returns	via	“accumulation	by	
dispossession”	 (Harvey,	 2003).	 That	 is	 to	 say	 it	 sought	 to	 reclaim	
territories	previously	abandoned	 to	 lower	value	use,	 like	 favelas,	other	
areas	of	low-income	housing,	and	public	spaces	and	facilities	catering	to	
their	residents.	
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At	 the	 level	 of	 urban	 governance,	 analysts	 also	 identify	 a	 significant	
transition	 during	 this	 period.	 In	 1993	 Rio’s	 Prefeitura	 (i.e.,	 municipal	
government)	 signed	 into	 law	 the	 first	 strategic	 plan	 of	 any	 city	 in	 the	
Global	 South,	 in	 partnership	with	 the	 city’s	 two	 leading	 private	 sector	
interest	 bodies	 (Vainer,	 2011).	 Critics	 argue	 this	marked	 the	 transition	
from	 a	 “managerial”	 to	 an	 “entrepreneurial”	 model	 of	 urban	
governance,	with	city	authorities	now	focussed	on	competing	for	global	
capital	flows	rather	than	attempting	to	respond	directly	to	the	needs	of	
residents	(Ribeiro	and	Santos	Junior,	2013;	see	also	Harvey,	2001;	Raco,	
2014).	 Vainer	 (2011)	 describes	 the	 shift	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	
“hegemonic	 power	 bloc”	 of	 politicians	 and	 key	 business	 interests,	
including	 land	 developers.	 He	 argues	 that	 by	mobilising	 a	 discourse	 of	
‘urban	 emergency,’	 this	 coalition	 was	 able,	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 semi-
legal	 jurisdictions,	 to	 legally	 enshrine	 its	 own	 right	 to	 suspend	 legal	
norms	and	bypass	political	contestation	in	the	‘collective	interest’	of	the	
city.		
	
Vainer	 brings	 the	 argument	 up	 to	 date	 by	 incorporating	 in	 his	 model	
processes	 associated	 with	 Rio’s	 mid-decade	 mega-events.	 Following	
Georgio	 Agamben	 (2005),	 Vainer	 suggests	 that	 mega-events	 like	 the	
Olympics	 can	 be	 harnessed	 by	 States	 to	 subvert	 legal	 protocol.	 So	
momentous	 are	mega-events	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 State	 actors	 that	 ensuring	
their	 success	 can	 trump	due	processes	of	municipal,	 state,	 and	 federal	
law.	Thus,	for	cities	playing	host	to	mega-events,	a	“state	of	exception”	
is	 created	 when	 the	 State	 ignores	 established	 laws	 in	 order	 to	 push	
through	 mega-event	 preparations.	 Examples	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 include	
the	 forced	 removal	 of	 local	 residents	 from	 Olympic	 venue	 sites,	
bypassing	 environmental	 assessment	 and	 regulation,	 and	 authoritarian	
public	 security	 measures	 carried	 out	 in	 public	 space.	 For	 Vainer,	 such	
tactics	 have	 become	 so	 commonplace	 that	 a	 permanent	 “state	 of	
exception”	has	been	created	in	Rio,	now	making	it	a	“City	of	Exception.”		
	
These	 related	processes	of	 capital	disinvestment/reinvestment	and	 the	
shift	 from	managerial	 to	entrepreneurial	 governance	may	 look	 familiar	
to	critical	accounts	of	neoliberalization	processes	in	many	other	cities	in	
the	 first	 decades	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century.	 Indeed,	 researchers	
examining	mega-events	and	mega-projects	in	other	contexts	have	often	
arrived	 at	 similar	 conclusions	 (e.g.,	 Haila,	 2008;	 Lehrer	 and	 Laidley,	
2008).	 In	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 literature,	 however,	 two	 factors	
distinguish	Rio	as	noteworthy	(if	not	entirely	unique).	The	first	is	that	the	
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ruling	political	coalition	has	placed	a	disproportionate	strategic	emphasis	
on	attracting	capital	through	the	hosting	of	mega-events	and	attracting	
tourism	 more	 generally.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 many	 of	 the	 exceptional	
measures	 taken	 have	 had	 unusually	 extreme	 impacts	 on	 the	 city	 and	
some	communities	in	particular.	
	
4a)	Securitisation,	social	cleansing	and	pro-rich	investment	
	
Much	of	 the	growing	 international	 literature	on	mega-events	and	 their	
urban	 impacts	dovetails	neatly	with	 the	City	of	Exception	 thesis	 (Haila,	
2008;	 Lehrer	 and	 Laidley,	 2008;	 Poynter	 and	 Viehoff,	 forthcoming).	 In	
the	 case	 of	 global	 sporting	 events	 like	 the	 World	 Cup	 and	 Olympics,	
special	 agreements	 are	 made	 between	 host	 countries/cities	 and	 the	
international	 sporting	bodies	 to	guarantee	 certain	norms	 in	areas	 such	
as	 branding	 rights,	 security	 and	 hospitality	 arrangements	 for	 the	
duration	 of	 the	 event	 (Gross,	 2012).	 In	more	 lasting	ways,	meanwhile,	
powerful	 entities	 with	 special	 legal	 status,	 like	 local	 organising	
committees	and	public-private	partnerships	of	various	kinds,	are	created	
to	develop	the	new	sporting	and	urban	infrastructure	that	mega-events	
invariably	require	(Fainstein,	2008;	Orueta	and	Fainstein,	2008).	In	many	
cases	 (and	 very	 clearly	 so	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Rio),	 these	 bodies	 become	
responsible	 for	 carrying	 out	 major,	 long-term	 transformations	 of	 the	
urban	 fabric	 while	 bypassing	 mainstream	 democratic	 institutions	
(Sanchez	and	Broudehoux,	2013:	135-36).	In	this	sense,	mega-events	can	
act	 as	 catalysts	 both	 for	 creating	 urban	 “states	 of	 exception”	 and	 as	 a	
means	of	reforming	the	urban	environment	in	the	interests	of	powerful	
actors.		
	
In	 opposition	 to	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 Post-Third	World	 City	 narrative	 –	 of	
expanded	 security	 and	 transport	 services,	 urban	 integration	 and	 pro-
poor	 development	 –	 critics	 have	 thus	 identified	 processes	 of	
securitisation	 and	 social	 cleansing	 that	 are	 being	 carried	 out	 in	 the	
interests	 of	 rich	 and	 powerful	 private	 interest	 groups.	 Instead	 of	
modernising	the	city	as	claimed,	some	have	identified	the	City	Project	as	
a	step	back	towards	Brazil’s	authoritarian	past,	drawing	parallels	to	the	
mass	favela	removal	campaign	carried	out	by	the	military	dictatorship	in	
the	1960s	(Brum,	2013;	Comitê	Popular,	2013).	
	
Differently	 from	 cities	 in	 the	 Global	 North,	 where	 mega-events	 and	
mega-projects	 provide	 catalytic	 moments	 for	 repressive	 State	 tactics	
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(Haila,	2008;	Lehrer	and	Laidley,	2008;	see	also	Frawley	and	Adair,	2013),	
such	 ‘opportunistic’	 moments	 are	 not	 necessarily	 required	 in	 Rio	 and	
other	similar	cities.	Heavy-handed	police	measures	are	common	with	or	
without	 the	 looming	deadlines	of	mega-projects	and	events	 (Garmany,	
2014).	 Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 an	 inglorious	 history	 of	 intensified	 State	
violence	in	Rio	during	periods	of	increased	international	attention.	There	
has	 been	 a	 tendency	 for	 mega-event	 security	 requirements	 to	 drive	
militarisation,	from	the	military	occupation	of	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	
favela	complex	during	the	1992	Rio	Environmental	Summit,	to	the	2007	
“PAN	 massacre”	 in	 the	 same	 location,	 when	 an	 estimated	 19	 people	
were	killed	in	police	operations	coinciding	with	the	Pan-American	Games	
(Gaffney,	2010).		
	
With	 regard	 to	 pacification,	 the	 Comitê	 Popular	 argue	 that	 the	
programme	 is,	 in	essence,	 a	 security	 strategy	 for	 the	mega-events	 and	
the	elite	areas	of	 the	 city	where	 they	will	 primarily	 take	place	 (Comitê	
Popular,	2013:	82).	Not	all	 those	pursuing	 the	City	of	Exception	 line	of	
argument	would	draw	such	a	direct	 link.	As	 stated	previously,	 the	UPP	
programme	was	unveiled	prior	 to	 the	Olympics	 announcement,	 and	 in	
any	 case	 mega-event	 arrangements	 cannot	 be	 the	 only	 determining	
factor,	with	other	operational	 and	political	 considerations	 also	 at	 play.	
Nonetheless,	the	securitisation	of	strategic	parts	of	the	city	still	fits	into	
a	 broader	 underlying	 analysis	 about	 the	 socio-spatial	 logic	 of	
neoliberalisation.	For	example,	Freeman	(2012)	argues	that	mega-events	
and	 pacification	 are	 connected	 in	 that	 they	 both	 result	 from	 the	 new	
dynamics	 of	 capitalist	 accumulation	 since	 Rio’s	 economic	 resurgence.	
Drug-trafficking	 gangs,	 he	 argues,	 have	 long	 dominated	 life	 in	 Rio’s	
favelas,	but	this	problem	has	only	been	seriously	addressed	since	it	has	
come	into	conflict	with	“elite	accumulation	strategies"	(Freeman,	2012:	
97).	 The	 implication	 is	 that	 pacification	 constitutes	 a	 repressive	 and	
arbitrary	 means	 of	 controlling	 favela	 populations	 that	 threaten	 the	
realisation	of	these	strategies,	rather	than	an	attempt	to	extend	norms	
of	public	policing	to	areas	where	they	had	previously	been	absent.	
	
Similar	 arguments	 have	 been	 developed	 regarding	 the	 equally	
contentious	 issue	 of	 favela	 removals.	 In	 2013	 the	 Comitê	 Popular	
estimated	 that	 over	 4,000	 families	 were	 under	 threat	 of	 removal,[vii]	
with	 close	 to	 5,000	 already	 evicted	 from	 their	 homes.	 They	 (Comitê	
Popular,	 2013:	 19-20)	 and	 Brum	 (2013)	 point	 out	 that	 the	majority	 of	
favela	residents	threatened	by	removal	are	concentrated	along	frontiers	
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of	elite	regeneration	and	urbanisation	processes	in	the	centre	and	west	
of	the	city.	In	this	respect	the	Olympic	zones	in	Barra	da	Tijuca	(the	site	
of	the	Olympic	Park)	and	the	city	centre	(including	Porto	Maravilha	and	
the	Maracanã	stadium)	might	be	seen	as	exclusion	zones	that	are	being	
repurposed	 for	 the	 mega-events	 and	 the	 longer-term	 interests	 of	
capital:	 a	 future	 in	 which	 long-established	 favelas	 do	 not	 figure	 (see	
again	 Figure	 1).	 Drawing	 on	 Smith’s	 (1996)	 concept	 of	 revanchist	
gentrification,	Freeman	(2012)	interprets	the	repertoire	of	favela	policies	
in	 these	 areas	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘reclaiming’	 of	 the	 city.	 He	 argues	 that	 for	
capital	 to	 achieve	 its	 aims	 in	 areas	 like	 the	Port	 Zone,	 favelas	must	be	
removed,	pacified,	or	otherwise	‘symbolically	tamed’	with	highly	visible	
modern	 infrastructure	 like	 cable-cars,	 that	 at	 once	 diminish	 their	
otherness,	 while	 exploiting	 Rio’s	 exotic	 image	 to	 create	 an	 enticing	
Olympic	spectacle.		
	
As	 with	 security,	 housing,	 and	 infrastructure	 policy,	 many	 have	 also	
questioned	the	logic	of	the	new	transport	interventions.	Rio’s	authorities	
emphasize	 that	 the	 principle	 extensions	 to	 the	 transport	 system	 are	
being	targeted	at	currently	underserved	areas	in	the	West	Zone	(metro	
extension	and	BRT),	and	also	in	the	port	area	(light	rail),	with	large	low-
income	 populations.	 Yet	 these	 are	 also	 the	 areas	 likely	 to	 experience	
major	gentrification	in	coming	years.	Meanwhile,	the	greatest	transport	
needs	 are	 focussed	 in	 the	 densely	 occupied	 North	 Zone	 and	 the	
sprawling	 suburbs	 and	 favelas	 of	 the	 Baixada	 Fluminense,	 which	 are	
being	 largely	 overlooked	 (Rodrigues,	 2014).	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 have	
argued	 that,	 as	 with	 the	 UPPs,	 new	 transport	 initiatives	 are	 primarily	
aimed	at	the	mega-events	–	facilitating	the	mobility	of	visitors	between	
Olympics	venues,	tourist	areas	and	the	international	airport	–	and	not	a	
serious	strategy	for	easing	Rio’s	huge	urban	mobility	problems	(Comitê	
Popular,	2013).	
	
In	 summation,	 critics	 of	 the	 City	 Project	 strongly	 contest	 the	 official	
claims	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 They	 argue	 that	 UPPs	 are	
primarily	 a	 tactic	 for	 controlling	 favela	 populations	 that	 threaten	 elite	
accumulation	 strategies,	 rather	 than	 an	 attempt	 to	 extend	 public	
security	and	citizenship	to	territories	where	they	have	historically	been	
denied.	Similarly,	they	dispute	that	housing,	infrastructure	and	transport	
policies	 are	 disinterestedly	 pursuing	 the	 goals	 of	 integration	 and	
development	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 population	 as	 a	 whole	 and	 the	
poorest	 in	particular.	 Instead	they	contend	that	 investment	 is	primarily	
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targeted	at	wealthy	areas	or	otherwise	designed	to	physically	transform	
low-income	territories	so	as	to	facilitate	gentrification.	Favelas	standing	
in	the	way	of	such	processes	must,	as	a	consequence,	be	securitized	and	
symbolically	tamed,	or,	even	worse,	removed	from	the	urban	landscape	
altogether.	
	
5)	Discussion:	A	Post-Third	World	City	or	neoliberal	City	of	Exception?	
	
Clearly	 the	 Post-Third	 World	 City	 narrative	 and	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	
thesis	tell	very	different	stories	about	both	the	origins	and	the	 impacts	
of	the	City	Project.	In	part,	this	is	because	they	must,	by	definition,	speak	
in	different	registers.	Proponents	of	the	Post-Third	World	City	narrative	
promote	 their	 policies	 based	 on	 “narratives	 of	 success,”	 adopting	 a	
discourse	 that	 all	 too	 readily	 drifts	 into	 unsubstantiated	 propaganda	
(Brownill	 et	 al.,	 2013:	 113).	 The	 City	 of	 Exception	 thesis,	 by	 contrast,	
occupies	 the	 space	 where	 intellectual	 scrutiny	 and	 social	 protest	
intersect,	and	as	a	result	tends	towards	critique	and	an	emphasis	on	the	
“dark	legacies”	ignored	by	official	discourse	(ibid.).	In	this	way	it	plays	a	
vital	 corrective	 role,	 but	 can	 in	 some	 instances	 be	 unconstructive	 and	
even	 reductive	 in	 its	 criticism.	 Beyond	 these	 discursive	 aspects,	
however,	 there	 are	more	 fundamental	 differences	 in	 the	way	 the	 two	
narratives	understand	Rio	de	Janeiro’s	history	and	current	conjuncture.	
	
At	the	heart	of	the	Post-Third	World	City	narrative	lies	the	concept	of	a	
“divided	 city”	 (Ventura,	 1994).	 Against	 this	 implicit	 framework	 it	
emphasizes	 geographically	 identifiable	 gaps	 in	 the	 provision	 of	
infrastructure	 and	 public	 services,	 both	 across	 the	 different	 regions	 of	
the	 city	 and	 in	 favelas	 generally.	 In	 this	 view	 both	 the	 State	 and	 the	
formal	economy	are	seen	as	having	been	historically	absent	 from	 large	
swathes	 of	 the	 city,	 allowing	 problems	 like	 drug	 trafficking	 to	 become	
entrenched.	The	 implication	 is	 that	Brazil’s	economic	upturn	–	and	 the	
new	 State	 activism	 emerging	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 government	 –	
presents	 an	 opportunity	 for	 expanding	 State	 services	 and	 formal	
economic	activity	to	these	areas.	This	highlights	an	important	difference	
with	mega-projects	in	the	Global	North,	which	are	typically	carried	out	in	
the	 name	 of	 revitalizing	 abandoned	 and	 run-down	 areas	 (Orueta	 and	
Fainstein,	2008).	 In	cities	 like	Rio	de	Janeiro,	where	large	swaths	of	the	
city	are	characterized	by	 informality	and	severe	socio-spatial	exclusion,	
mega-projects	 have	 the	 slightly	 different	 rationale	 of	 establishing	 a	
formal/State	presence	in	‘un-colonized,’	disconnected	parts	of	the	city.	
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The	City	of	Exception	literature	tends	to	draw	on	a	different	theoretical	
tradition	that	dates	back	to	debates	over	the	role	of	the	military	regime	
in	 favela	 removals	 and	 other	 policies	 of	 “urban	 despoliation”	 in	 the	
1960s	 and	 ‘70s	 (most	 notably	 Kowarick,	 1980).	 This	 view,	 developed	
primarily	 by	 Brazilian	 urban	 sociologists,	 portrayed	 the	 State	 not	 as	
absent,	 but	 as	 an	 active	 agent	 in	 the	 production	 of	 urban	 inequalities	
through	 its	wilful	neglect	and	repression	of	 low-income	populations.	 In	
simplified	terms	–	unlike	research	in	the	Global	North	(e.g.,	Harvey,	1973	
Smith,	1979),	which	emphasized	the	predominate	role	of	privately	held	
capital	 –	 in	 Brazil	 the	 State	was	 viewed	 as	 the	 proactive	 enforcement	
arm	 of	 the	 economic	 elite,	 holding	 down	 the	 cost	 of	 Brazil’s	 mass	
reserve	army	of	labour	and,	where	necessary,	forcibly	displacing	it	from	
valuable	urban	territory	to	facilitate	capitalist	accumulation.		
	
Current	 critiques	 draw	 on	 some	 of	 the	 core	 ideas	 of	 this	 literature,	
highlighting	 important	 parallels	 with	 the	 situation	 today	 (eg.	 Brum,	
2013).	They	have	challenged	the	view	that	 the	State	 is	a	neutral	actor,	
identifying	 the	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 its	 policies	 benefit	 key	 interest	
groups,	not	least	the	construction	firms	and	utility	providers	that	directly	
benefit	 from	 huge	 State	 contracts	 and	 new	 markets.	 Even	 more	
importantly,	the	City	of	Exception	literature	emphasizes	the	persistence	
of	 social,	 economic	 and	political	 inequalities	 in	 shaping	 the	design	and	
implementation	 of	 the	 new	 policies.	 While	 the	 Post-Third	 World	 City	
narrative	claims	the	urban	reforms	are	utilitarian,	or	even	pro-poor,	the	
City	of	Exception	 literature	points	out	that	the	primary	benefactors	are	
often	 elite	 interest	 groups	 and	 that	 low-income	 populations	 are	
suffering	 many	 negative	 impacts,	 including	 intensified	 policing	 and	
eviction.	In	these	ways	we	believe	the	City	of	Exception	literature	offers	
a	valid	and	incisive	critique	of	the	City	Project.		
	
Despite	 its	 strengths,	 however,	 there	 are	 also	 certain	 problems	 and	
omissions	 within	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 approach	 itself	 that	 must	 be	
explored	if	a	fuller	understanding	 is	to	be	reached.	 In	the	remainder	of	
the	article	we	focus	on	three	 issues	 in	particular.	Firstly,	we	argue	that	
elements	 of	 both	 complexity	 and	 coherence	within	 the	 Brazilian	 State	
must	 be	 given	 a	 more	 central	 place	 in	 the	 analysis.	 Secondly,	 we	
highlight	 the	 role	 of	 Rio’s	 uneven	 geographical	 development	 and	 the	
significant	 variations	 in	 policy	 impacts	 that	 this	 produces.	 Thirdly,	 we	
believe	that	more	effort	must	be	made	to	distinguish	between	 impacts	
	 18	
that	are	the	direct	results	of	the	policies	we	define	as	being	part	of	the	
City	Project	and	those	that	result	from	broader	social	transformations.		
	
5a)	Complexity	and	continuity	in	the	Brazilian	State	
	
The	first	issue	worthy	of	critique	is	the	insufficient	attention	the	City	of	
Exception	 thesis	 gives	 to	 the	 internal	 workings	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 State.	
These	 touch	 upon	 broader	 questions	 about	 the	 applicability	 of	
neoliberalisation	 theory	 to	 the	 context	 of	 the	 urban	Global	 South	 (see	
Roy	 2009	 and	 2011;	 Parnell	 and	 Robinson	 2011).	 As	 explained	
previously,	 the	 range	of	policies	connected	 to	 the	City	Project	 is	highly	
diverse,	 involving	 different	 levels	 and	 departments	 of	 government	 as	
well	 as	 non-State	 actors.	 The	 complex	 and	 frequently	 contradictory	
interactions	between	these	different	bodies	and	policies	result	from	the	
complex	 and	 contradictory	 nature	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 State	 itself.	 Ribeiro	
and	Santos	Junior	(2013)	point	out	that	while	the	municipal	government,	
particularly	 since	 the	 accession	 of	 Mayor	 Eduardo	 Paes	 in	 2008,	 has	
pursued	a	recognisably	neoliberal	policy	agenda,	 it	 is	perfectly	possible	
for	 this	 to	 co-exist	 with	 “neo-Keynesian,”	 or	 neo-developmentalist,	
policies	 like	 PAC	 and	 MCMV	 at	 the	 federal	 level.[viii]	 At	 a	 deeper	
institutional	level	they	offer	a	useful	route	forward	by	conceiving	of	the	
current	 urban	 coalition	 as	 a	 hegemonic,	 rather	 than	 unitary	 bloc.	 This	
encompasses	multiple	“grammars”	of	urban	politics,	such	as	corporatist,	
clientelist	 and	 patrimonialist	 structures,	 with	 which	 neoliberal	 actors	
must	coexist	and	through	which	their	policies	must	often	be	channelled.	
	
The	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 City	 Project	 as	 a	 hegemonic	 project	 held	
together	 by	 pragmatic	 political	 alliances	 and	 a	 shared	 policy	 narrative	
(and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 highly	 fragmented	 institutional	 setting)	 has	
other	analytical	benefits.	Crucially,	it	helps	to	explain	the	participation	of	
progressive	 State	and	 civil	 society	actors	 in	 the	more	pro-poor	policies	
like	Morar	 Carioca	 and	 UPP	 Social,	 and	 also	 why	 these	 programmes	
were	progressively	hollowed	out	as	the	neoliberal	wing	of	the	coalition	
grew	 in	 confidence	 after	 2009.	 It	 also	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 contrasting	
reactions	 of	 different	 political	 actors	 to	 the	 mass	 protests	 in	 Brazil	 in	
June-July	2013,	which	 in	Rio	were	closely	tied	to	opposition	to	the	City	
Project.[ix]	
	
Just	as	it	reveals	the	complexity	of	the	Brazilian	State,	however,	the	City	
Project	 also	 exhibits	 important	 aspects	 of	 uniformity	 and	 historical	
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continuity.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	the	treatment	of	favela	residents.	
For	 example,	 Rodrigues	 draws	 parallels	 between	 the	UPPs	 and	 related	
social	 and	 infrastructure	 policies	 and	 the	 various	 attempts	 of	 the	
developmentalist	 State	 of	 the	 1950s	 and	 ‘60s	 to	 “civilize”	 favela	
residents	 (2013:	13-14).	Viewed	 in	 this	way,	pacification	comes	 to	 look	
less	like	a	neoliberal	policy	aimed	solely	at	protecting	capital	flows,	and	
more	 like	 a	 hybrid	 neoliberal/neo-developmentalist	 policy	 that	 also	
seeks	 to	draw	favela	populations	 into	national	development	processes.	
Brum	 (2013),	 meanwhile,	 highlights	 important	 similarities	 between	
current	 favela	 removals	and	the	mass	 removal	campaigns	of	 the	1960s	
and	‘70s.	Just	as	then,	recent	removals	have	resulted	from	co-ordinated	
action	between	 the	 State	 and	private	 interests,	with	 support	 from	 the	
mainstream	media	and	sections	of	 the	middle	class	 (Brum,	2013:	199).	
Furthermore,	 although	 Rio’s	 Municipal	 Housing	 Secretariat	 (SMH)	 is	
controlled	by	the	leftist	Workers	Party,	it	has	been	complicit	in	removal	
policies	 in	 favelas	 like	 Providência.	 Such	 evidence	 of	 cross-party	
consensus	 in	 pursuing	 large-scale	 favela	 removal	 is	 all	 the	 more	
surprising	in	that	 it	follows	a	period	when	on-site	upgrading	seemed	to	
have	won	 the	 day.	 This	 suggests	 a	 disposition	 towards	 favela	 removal	
within	 the	 governing	 elite	 that,	 to	 some	 degree,	 transcends	 party	
ideology	 and	 persists	 in	 spite	 of	 long-term	 political	 and	 institutional	
transformations.	
	
In	 this	 light,	 it	may	 be	 necessary	 to	 acknowledge	 aspects	 of	 a	 kind	 of	
Brazilian	 (or	more	accurately,	perhaps,	a	Carioca)	exceptionalism	when	
analysing	 Rio’s	 City	 Project.	 This	 is	most	 clearly	 visible	 in	 the	way	 that	
globally	mobile	policies	have	been	implemented	and	received	compared	
to	other	contexts.	For	example,	the	UPP	programme	is	supposedly	based	
on	 principles	 of	 community	 policing,	 but	 has	 been	 given	 the	 name	 of	
“pacification”	and	is	being	carried	out	by	a	heavily	armed	military	police	
force	 with	 exceptional	 powers	 and	 a	 history	 of	 abuse	 in	 favela	
territories.	 Likewise,	 cable	 cars	 and	 other	 new	 infrastructure	 have	
typically	 been	 installed	 in	 favelas	 with	 little	 or	 no	 consultation	 and	
frequently	 against	 the	 wishes	 of	 residents.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 a	 bizarre	
situation	in	which	cable	cars	are	widely	resented	in	affected	favelas	and	
seen	 as	 cosmetic	 interventions	 designed	 to	 conceal	 persistent	 social	
problems	from	outside	onlookers.	By	contrast,	 in	Medellín,	where	they	
were	 first	 built,	 it	 was	 precisely	 that	 sense	 of	 symbolic	 inclusion	 that	
residents	 seem	 most	 to	 have	 valued,	 despite	 their	 practical	 and	
economic	benefits	being	far	less	obvious	(Brand	and	Dávila,	2011).	Such	
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cynicism	 among	 favela	 residents	 seem	 to	 reflect	 the	 long	 historical	
relationship	 in	 Rio	 between	 urban	 beautification	 projects	 and	 the	
removal	and	repression	of	low-income	groups	(see	Abreu,	1987).		
	
These	 elements	 of,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 complexity	 and	 contestation,	
and	 in	 the	 second	 instance,	 continuity	 and	 consensus	 within	 the	
Brazilian	State,	support	the	argument	that,	when	not	applied	with	great	
care,	urban	neoliberalization	theory	can	end	up	concealing	as	much	as	it	
reveals	 about	 cities	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 (Parnell	 and	 Robinson,	 2012).	
Unlike	in	the	Global	North	–	where	inequalities	of	capitalist	development	
may	often	be	tempered	by	State	involvement	(Fainstein,	2008)	–	in	the	
Global	 South,	 greater	 State	 involvement	 by	 no	 means	 leads	 to	 more	
equal	 public	 benefits	 (see	 also	 Bezmez,	 2008;	Moncada,	 2013).	 Yet	 on	
the	 other	 hand,	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 State	 in	 processes	 of	
securitization	 and	 social	 cleansing	 and	 also	 in	 the	provision	of	 housing	
and	 infrastructure	 in	 lower-income	areas	makes	 it	problematic	 to	 label	
these	 policies	 collectively	 as	 “neoliberal”.	 Therefore,	 while	 we	 do	 not	
dispute	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 process	 of	 neoliberalization	 of	 urban	
governance	during	Rio’s	Olympic	Era,	this	must	be	placed	in	the	context	
of	 a	 complex	 State	 structure	 in	 which	 –	 for	 both	 political	 and	 deeper	
institutional	 reasons	–	neoliberalism	must	 inevitably	 coexist	with	other	
logics	of	governance	and	power.	
	
5b)	Uneven	development	
	
Following	on	from	questions	surrounding	the	role	of	the	State,	a	second	
area	 in	 need	 of	 scrutiny	 concerns	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Rio’s	 unusually	
complex	 physical	 and	 social	 geographies	 confound	 any	 assumptions	 of	
uniform	policy	impacts	across	the	urban	territory.	While	the	imbalanced	
macro-geographies	of	urban	interventions	have	been	discussed	–	eg.	 in	
the	 spatial	 distribution	 of	 UPPs,	 favela	 removals	 and	 new	 transport	
networks	–	this	unevenness	also	plays	out	 in	 less	predictable	ways	at	a	
more	 local	 scale.	 This	 has	 created	 relative	 winners	 and	 losers	 even	
amongst	 the	 favela	 communities	 and	 other	 low-income	 populations	
identified	by	the	City	of	Exception	thesis	as	the	primary	victims	of	Rio’s	
urban	 transformation.	 These	 variations	 are	 fundamental	 to	
understanding	the	different	ways	the	City	Project	has	been	experienced	
locally	and	the	varying	attitudes	this	has	generated	across	the	city.	Two	
examples	from	different	parts	of	the	city	serve	to	illustrate	this	point.[x]	
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Perhaps	 the	most	 high-profile	 and	 symbolic	 case	 of	 a	 removal	 process	
associated	 with	 Rio’s	 mega-events	 concerns	 favela	 Vila	 Autódromo	 in	
Barra	 da	 Tijuca.	 Autódromo	 lies	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 Lagoa	 de	
Jacarepaguá,	 next	 to	 the	 old	 Autódromo	 de	 Nelson	 Piquet	 racetrack,	
which	will	become	the	site	of	the	new	Olympic	Park	(see	again	Figure	1).	
Although	the	community	was	granted	an	official	certificate	of	possession	
in	 the	 1990s,	 and	 despite	 the	 initial	 architects’	 design	 of	 the	 Olympic	
Park	not	requiring	evictions,	Mayor	Paes	has	shown	a	determination	to	
remove	 Vila	 Autódromo,	 supposedly	 to	 ensure	 accessibility	 to	 the	
Olympic	Park	(Brum,	2013:	200).	This	has	led	to	a	drawn-out	(and	at	the	
time	 of	 writing	 still	 unresolved)	 struggle	 with	 local	 residents	 who	 are	
resisting	eviction.	Similar	threats	hang	over	several	small	favelas	a	short	
distance	 to	 the	north	 in	 Jacarepaguá,	which	 lie	on	 the	 route	projected	
for	the	TransOlímpica	BRT	bus	route	(Rio	On	Watch,	2014).	
	
In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 these	 cases,	 Asa	 Branca,	 a	 larger	 favela	 just	 one	
kilometre	 to	 the	 north	 of	 Vila	 Autódromo	has	 had	 a	 far	more	 positive	
experience	(see	Richmond,	forthcoming).	 It	 received	a	major	upgrading	
from	 the	Prefeitura	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2012,	 bringing	 paved	 streets,	 drains	
and	 streetlighting.	 Although	 carried	 out	 through	 the	 small	 Bairro	
Maravilha	programme,	rather	than	Morar	Carioca	or	PAC,	residents	see	
the	belated	arrival	of	the	State	as	a	direct	result	of	the	Olympics	and	the	
greater	 attention	 this	 has	 directed	 towards	 favelas	 in	 the	 west	 of	 the	
city.	 The	 upgrading	 was	 certainly	 not	 participatory	 and	 was	 attained	
through	 traditional	 clientelist	 lobbying	 of	 the	 Prefeitura.	 Indeed,	 Asa	
Branca	was	due	to	receive	a	more	comprehensive	redevelopment	from	
Morar	Carioca,	but	now	seems	unlikely	to,	given	the	doubts	surrounding	
the	programme	 (ibid.).	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 not	 accurate	 to	 say	 that	 they	
have	suffered	directly	from	the	mega-events,	and	indeed	many	residents	
would	view	their	impact	positively.	What	is	perhaps	more	telling,	as	we	
explain	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 is	 that	many	 residents	 believe	 that	 rather	
than	 the	 mega-events	 themselves,	 the	 uncontrolled	 speculative	
development	unfolding	in	the	surrounding	area	will	ultimately	threaten	
the	 community’s	 survival,	 not	 in	 the	 lead-up	 to	 2016,	 but	 in	 the	 years	
that	follow.	
	
Another	example	of	uneven	impacts	concerns	the	area	surrounding	the	
Maracanã	stadium,	where	three	favelas	have	been	affected	by	the	City	
Project	 in	 very	 different	 ways	 (Richmond,	 forthcoming).	 The	 smallest	
and	 closest	 to	 the	 stadium,	 Favela	 do	Metrô,	 has	 been	 subjected	 to	 a	
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long	 and	 painful	 eviction	 process	 similar	 to	 that	 occurring	 in	 Vila	
Autódromo	 (Rio	 On	 Watch,	 2013).	 There	 too	 the	 justifications	 for	
removal	have	continually	been	changed	and	the	municipal	government	
adopted	a	similar	divide-and-rule	strategy,	making	conditional	offers	of	
alternative	 housing	 that	 resulted	 in	 some	 residents	 being	 removed	 to	
distant	locations.	Residents	who	remained	were	left	to	live	in	a	partially	
demolished	neighbourhood	that	attracted	new	invasions	from	homeless	
squatters	and	drug	users,	 as	well	 as	 vermin.	By	 contrast,	Mangueira,	 a	
large	 hillside	 favela	 visible	 from	 the	 stadium	 and	widely	 known	 for	 its	
historic	 samba	 school,	 has	 received	 large	 investments	 in	 monumental	
infrastructure	 and	 new	 housing	 through	 PAC	 as	 well	 as	 social	
programmes.	Finally,	Tuiuti,	 a	 little-known,	medium-sized	 favela	 that	 is	
slightly	 further	 away	 and	 less	 visible	 has	 been	 overlooked	 by	 the	 City	
Project	altogether.		
	
In	both	the	environs	of	the	Olympic	Park	and	the	area	surrounding	the	
Maracanã,	the	policies	of	the	City	Project	have	been	implemented	very	
unevenly,	even	over	very	small	distances.	As	argued	by	Freeman	(2012:	
106-9),	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 partly	 the	 result	 of	 plans	 to	 remould	 the	
surroundings	of	the	key	event	venues	to	create	a	global	spectacle.	In	the	
case	 of	 Favela	 do	 Metrô	 and	 Vila	 Autódromo,	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	
respective	venues	means	that	they	must	be	removed	in	order	to	project	
the	desired	global	 image	of	 the	 city.	By	 contrast,	Mangueira’s	 size	and	
profile	mean	that	removal	is	unviable,	so	spectacle	can	best	be	produced	
through	 monumental	 infrastructure	 that	 “symbolically	 transforms	
Mangueira	 from	 a	 dangerous	 threatening	 place	 into	 an	 exotic	
background”	 (Freeman,	 2012:	 108).	 Tuiuti,	 meanwhile,	 is	 far	 enough	
away	that	it	is	essentially	invisible	and	requires	no	symbolic	adjustment.	
However,	spectacle	does	not	account	for	Asa	Branca’s	upgrading,	which	
will	 not	 be	 visible	 to	 the	 public.	 To	 understand	 the	 timing	 of	 its	
upgrading	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 turn	 to	 more	 run-of-the-mill	 questions	 of	
how	 favela	 communities	 access	 policies	 through	 clientelist	 networks.	
Namely,	 while	 it	 is	 unlikely	 Asa	 Branca	 would	 have	 been	 upgraded	
without	 the	 Olympics,	 there	 was	 also	 no	 guarantee	 upgrading	 would	
have	happened	without	effective	political	manoeuvring	by	 its	 residents	
association.		
	
A	final	point	relating	to	uneven	impacts	concerns	the	way	that	variation	
in	local	social	conditions	can	influence	the	perceived	local	effectiveness	
of	 policies.	 The	 one	 significant	 policy	 that	 has	 been	 implemented	 in	
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Tuiuti	 was	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 UPP	 Mangueira-Tuiuti	 in	 late-2011	
(Richmond,	 forthcoming).	 As	 in	most	 cases,	 pacification	 failed	 to	 evict	
the	local	Comando	Vermelho	(CV)	drug	trafficking	faction,	instead	simply	
driving	it	underground.	This	has	created	complications	for	residents	who	
are	still	subject	to	trafficker	influence.	Nonetheless,	many	residents	view	
pacification	 as	 a	 qualified	 improvement,	 largely	 due	 to	 its	 effects	 of	
reducing	 the	 visibility	 of	 arms	 and	 drug	 dealing	 in	 the	 neighbourhood.	
Whereas	 in	 other	 favelas	 stop-and-search	 procedures	 and	 arbitrary	
detainment	 have	 been	 widely	 used,	 and	 police	 and	 traffickers	 have	
engaged	in	shoot-outs,	the	social	situation	in	Tuiuti	since	pacification	has	
been	 relatively	 calm.	 This	 is	 because,	 unlike	 larger	 favelas	 and	 those	
more	 strategically	 important	 for	 the	 drugs	 trade,	 Tuiuti	 did	 not	
experience	major	 conflict	between	 factions,	 and	only	 infrequent	police	
incursions	 prior	 to	 pacification.	 In	 favelas	 like	 Tuiuti,	 the	 UPP	
programme’s	 primary	 aims	 of	 reducing	 gang-related	 violence	 without	
alienating	the	community	seems	to	be	more	achievable	than	elsewhere,	
even	if	the	more	expansive	aims	of	ending	trafficking	and	guaranteeing	
residents’	citizenship	rights	remain	elusive.	
	
These	 examples	 emphasize	 the	 highly	 uneven	 ways	 in	 which	 current	
policies	 unfold	 across	 urban	 space.	 They	 suggest	 that	 while	 Vainer’s	
(2011)	 critique	 may	 offer	 a	 useful	 broad-brush	 understanding	 of	 such	
processes,	 greater	 nuance	 is	 needed	when	 analysing	 specific	 empirical	
contexts.	 Logics	 of	 securitization	 and	 spectacle	 are	 clearly	 at	 play,	 yet	
they	overlay	pre-existing	dynamics	 that	 can	be	decisive	 in	determining	
where	 mega-event	 policies	 are	 implemented	 and	 with	 what	
consequences.	 Rather	 than	 exhibiting	 a	 singular	 and	 uniform	mode	 of	
‘exception’	 throughout	 the	 entire	 city	 or	 even	within	 special	 “Olympic	
Zones,”	this	suggests	that	there	are	in	fact	multiple	and	varying	‘states	of	
exception’	 that	 operate	 at	 different	 intensities	 and	 according	 to	
different	 geographies.	 As	 the	 examples	 of	 Asa	 Branca’s	 upgrading	 or	
Tuiuti’s	relatively	unobtrusive	process	of	pacification	suggest,	 it	may	be	
that	deeper	institutional	power	networks	can	themselves	provide	states	
of	 exception	 from	 states	of	 exception.	 In	 this	way,	 it	may	be	useful	 to	
shift	 our	 understanding	 from	 a	 “territorial	 imagination	 of	 cores	 and	
peripheries”	 to	one	of	 “fractal	 geometries”,	 in	which	different	 systems	
of	power	interact	across	the	city	(Roy,	2011:	233).	
	
5c)	Social	change	
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A	final	point	to	consider	 is	how	far	the	City	Project	departs	 from	social	
trends	 already	 unfolding	 in	 Rio	 and	 other	 Brazilian	 cities	 regardless	 of	
the	 mega-events.	 Once	 again,	 the	 question	 of	 housing	 provides	 the	
clearest	 case	 for	 this.	As	discussed	above,	perhaps	 the	most	 contested	
interventions	of	 the	City	Project	 are	 those	 that	 supposedly	necessitate	
the	removal	of	favela	residents.	These	cases	are	numerous	and	fit	neatly	
with	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	 thesis,	 due	 in	 large	 part	 to	 the	 role	 mega-
events	 play	 in	 creating	 a	 political	 climate	 conducive	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	
eminent	domain.	However,	State-led	favela	removal	 is	simply	the	most	
obvious	manifestation	 of	 a	much	more	 extensive	 reorganisation	 effort	
within	Rio	and	other	cities	under	the	dual	dynamics	of	gentrification	and	
suburbanisation	(Gaffney,	2013).		
	
As	shown	by	the	FIPE-ZAP	index,	the	housing	market	across	central	Rio	
de	 Janeiro	 has	 boomed	 in	 recent	 years	 fuelling	 gentrification,	 rent	
squeezes	and,	 frequently,	displacement	 (FIPE-ZAP).[xi]	This	has	affected	
all	 levels	of	the	market,	most	dramatically	 in	favourably	located	favelas	
like	Vidigal	and	Santa	Marta	and	central	working-class	neighbourhoods	
like	Lapa	and	Cidade	Nova,	but	also	middle-class	and	elite	areas	 in	 the	
South	 Zone	 (Gaffney,	 2013).	 Besides	 its	 direct	 role	 in	 driving	
gentrification	 in	the	Port	Zone,	 the	City	Project	has	 indirectly	bolstered	
speculative	investment	and	pushed	up	house	prices	through	pacification	
and	 infrastructure	 investments	 (Frischtak	 and	Mandel,	 2012).	 Thus	 the	
mega-events	 seem	 primarily	 to	 have	 oriented	 and	 accelerated	
gentrification	 processes	 rather	 than	 producing	 them	 ex	 nihilo.	 Brazil’s	
continued	 economic	 growth	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 global	 downturn	
and	the	apparent	promise	held	out	by	Rio’s	oil	economy	made	the	city’s	
prime	property	an	attractive	asset.	 In	 the	context	of	weak	 institutional	
and	 legal	 architecture	 for	 combating	 property	 speculation,	 such	
conditions	were	always	likely	to	produce	dynamics	of	this	kind,	although	
in	 the	absence	of	 the	Olympics	 the	process	would	 certainly	have	been	
slower	and	less	geographically	co-ordinated	(Rolnik,	2013).		
	
The	gentrification	of	central	areas	is	paralleled	by	the	suburbanisation	of	
lower-income	 groups,	 through	 both	 the	 property	 market	 and	
government	policy.	 The	huge	 federal	 social	housing	programme	Minha	
Casa	 Minha	 Vida	 (MCMV),	 although	 “neo-Keynesian”	 (Ribeiro	 and	
Santos	Júnior,	2013)	 in	design,	has	an	underlying	market	 logic	dictating	
that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 units	 must	 be	 built	 at	 the	 urban	 periphery	
where	 land	 values	 are	 cheapest	 (Cardoso	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Along	with	 the	
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different	 forms	 of	 gentrification	 occurring	 in	 central	 areas,	 this	 is	
encouraging	 a	 broad	 dynamic	 of	 social	 segregation	 at	 the	 city	 level.	 A	
third	dynamic,	however,	blurs	 the	picture	 somewhat:	 rising	purchasing	
power	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 Rio’s	 income	 scale,	 primarily	 thanks	 to	 job	
growth	and	an	activist	federal	minimum	wage	policy	(Rodrigues,	2013).	
This	 and	 increasing	 access	 to	 credit	 have	 created	 more	 demand	 for	
suburban	 housing	 within	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 made	 the	 periphery	
itself	more	socially	diverse.	
	
These	 different	 processes	 –	 gentrification,	 suburbanisation,	 and	 the	
diversification	 of	 peripheral	 areas	 –	 are	 also	 visible	 in	 other	 Brazilian	
cities	and	therefore	cannot	be	reduced	solely	to	the	impact	of	the	mega-
events.	As	such	they	contradict	the	implicit	claim	of	the	City	of	Exception	
thesis	 that	 mega-events	 and	 the	 state	 of	 exception	 are	 crucial	
ingredients	 for	 social	 cleansing	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	 Instead	 the	 city’s	
reorganization	along	more	segregated	lines	appears	to	be	a	longer-term	
process,	 resulting	 from	 both	 its	 shifting	 position	 within	 the	 global	
capitalist	 economy	 and	 the	 (in	 some	 cases	 contradictory)	 social	 and	
geographical	effects	of	federal	housing	and	income-support	policies.	
	
6)	Conclusion	
	
This	 paper	 has	 argued	 that	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 City	 Project	 is	 a	 loosely	
connected	set	of	urban	policies	designed	and	implemented	by	a	diverse	
range	 of	 State	 and	 non-State	 actors	 in	 coalition.	 This	 coalition	 was	
sustained	under	the	hegemony	of	a	neoliberal	municipal	leadership,	and	
mobilized	what	we	 describe	 as	 a	 Post-Third	World	 City	 narrative.	 This	
offered	 a	 particular	 account	 of	 the	 city’s	 history	 –	 specifically	
emphasising	 the	 negative	 legacies	 of	 rapid	 urbanisation	 and	 urban	
fragmentation	–	and	proposed	a	set	of	 ‘innovative’	policy	proposals	for	
overcoming	 them.	However,	 this	narrative	 came	 to	be	 challenged	by	a	
competing	 account	 of	 the	 City	 Project	 proposed	 by	 academic	 analysts	
and	 social	 movements,	 broadly	 defined	 here	 as	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	
thesis	 (Vainer	 2011).	 This	 thesis	 proposes	 that	 rather	 than	 acting	 on	
behalf	of	the	population	as	a	whole,	and	historically	excluded	groups	in	
particular,	the	new	policies	are	using	upcoming	mega-events	to	create	a	
“state	 of	 exception”	 (Agamben,	 2005)	 so	 as	 to	 securitize	 and	 socially	
cleanse	 key	 strategic	 areas	 in	 pursuit	 of	 narrow	 private	 and	 elite	
interests.	
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Our	 stance	 in	 this	 article,	 on	 one	 hand,	 is	 that	 the	 City	 of	 Exception	
thesis	 provides	 an	 insightful	 critique	 of	 the	 Post-Third	 World	 City	
narrative.	 In	 particular,	 it	 identifies	 continuing	 patterns	 of	 socio-
economic	inequality	that	characterize	Rio’s	urban	development.	On	the	
other	hand,	however,	we	argue	that	 it	 fails	to	provide	a	full	account	of	
both	the	origins	and	impacts	of	the	City	Project	or	of	the	various	changes	
currently	unfolding	in	Rio.	For	example,	it	struggles	to	account	for	similar	
processes	 of	 urban	 exclusion	 and	 State	 aggression	 prior	 to	 both	
processes	of	neoliberalization	and	to	 the	“state	of	exception”	provided	
by	 the	 mega-events,	 or	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 “neo-Keynesian”	
policies	 during	 the	 Olympic	 era.	 To	 achieve	 this	 level	 of	 analytical	
nuance,	we	believe	greater	attention	must	be	paid	 to	 the	complexities	
and	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 State,	 to	 the	 uneven	 urban	
geographies	of	policy	impacts,	and	to	the	interaction	between	policy	and	
broader	social	change	in	Brazil.		
	
Our	exploration	of	these	questions	squares	with	broader	concerns	in	the	
literature	 about	 both	 the	 role	 of	 mega-events	 in	 urban	 development	
processes	 and	 of	 the	 different	 theoretical	 frameworks	 needed	 for	
analysis	 of	 cities	 in	 the	Global	 North	 and	 South.	We	 have	 argued	 that	
important	 differences	 exist	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 mega-events	 and	 mega-
projects	are	undertaken	in	cities	like	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Unlike	in	the	Global	
North,	where	such	processes	are	often	carried	out	under	the	banner	of	
urban	 revitalization,	 in	 countries	 like	Brazil	 the	 intent	 is	more	often	 to	
formalize	informal	space	and	take	control	of	under-governed	areas.	Such	
tendencies	offer	a	critique	to	mega-project	analyses	that	suggest	higher	
levels	of	State	involvement	often	lead	to	increased	public	benefits	(e.g.,	
Fainstein,	 2008):	 unlike	 in	 cities	 of	 the	 Global	 North,	 State	 oversight	
appears	in	many	instances	to	worsen	the	social	effects	of	mega-projects	
in	Rio	and	other	 cities	 in	 the	Global	 South	 (e.g.,	Bezmez,	2008;	Parnell	
and	 Robinson,	 2012).	 As	 Eduardo	Moncada	 shows	 (2013),	 rapid	 urban	
redevelopment	 in	such	contexts	may	also	produce	ample	opportunities	
for	 illicit	 and	 criminal	 networks,	 blurring	 the	 lines	between	 formal	 and	
informal	 growth	 and	 helping,	 perhaps,	 to	 explain	 recent	 spikes	 in	
violence	in	many	developing	cities	(see	also	Abello-Colak	and	Guarneros-
Meza,	 2014).	 This	 contributes	 to	 research	 that	 critically	 challenges	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 State,	 neoliberalism,	 and	 globalisation	 (e.g.,	
Robinson,	2011),	and	responds	to	calls	for	nuanced	theoretical	analyses	
of	non-Western	cities	(e.g.,	Roy,	2009;	2011).		
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Still	 to	 be	 considered	 are	 a	 multitude	 of	 urban	 (re)development	
processes	 linked	 to	 mega-events	 and	 networks	 of	 globalisation.	 As	
Vainer	(2011)	and	others	point	out,	events	like	the	Olympics	can	provide	
pivotal	 moments	 whereby	 urban	 transformation	 is	 not	 only	 fast	 and	
undemocratic,	but	also	where	changes	to	governance	and	processes	of	
capitalist	accumulation	can	be	profound	and	longstanding.	According	to	
Mike	 Raco	 (2014),	 pressure	 to	 ‘deliver’	 mega-events	 may	 in	 fact	
represent	a	fundamental	change	in	State	governance	and	function	in	the	
twenty-first	 century.	 Juan	 Pablo	 Galvis	 (2014)	 provides	 further	 insight	
from	 Latin	 America,	 showing	 how	 emergent	 community	 governance	
efforts	work	 to	 further	exclude	marginalized	groups	 from	public	 space.	
Understanding	 these	 processes	 –	 and	 how	 they	 manifest	 in	 rapidly	
developing	 countries	 like	 Brazil	 –	 will	 be	 increasingly	 important	 for	
making	 sense	 of	 urban	 development	 and	 change	 in	 coming	 years.	We	
hope	 this	 article	 contributes	 to	 these	 discussions,	 and	 helps	 to	
encourage	 critical	 perspectives	 useful	 for	 unravelling	 the	 connections	
between	 urbanisation,	 capitalist	 development,	 neoliberal	 governance,	
and	 processes	 of	 globalisation.
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Notes																																																									
i	Authors’	own	translation	
ii	In	addition	to	being	implemented	at	different	timescales	and	for	
different	motivations,	many	policies	are	administered	at	separate	levels	
and	by	individual	government	departments,	each	with	its	own	aims,	
remit,	budget	and	modus	operandi.	For	further	explanation,	please	see	
Sanchez	and	Broudehoux	(2013).	
iii	 The	official	 promotional	 video	of	 the	UPP	programme,	 ‘UPP	 came	 to	
stay,’	gives	a	clear	account	of	the	Post-Third	World	City	narrative	of	Rio’s	
history.	See	http://www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us	 (accessed	11	
March	2014).	
iv	Authors’	translation.	
v	Aside	from	Vainer	(2011),	other	papers	broadly	following	the	city	of	
exception	analysis	include	Freeman	(2012),	Gaffney	(2010),	Sanchez	and	
Broudehoux	(2013)	and	Comitê	Popular	(2013;	2014).	Although	they	
expand	upon	or	diverge	from	the	analysis	in	important	ways,	Ribeiro	and	
Santos	(2013),	Brum	(2013),	Brownill	et	al.	(2013)	and	Rodrigues	(2013)	
adopt	a	broadly	similar	approach.	
vi		See	Freeman	(2012)	for	a	detailed	application	of	this	theoretical	
model	to	Rio.	
vii	Although	calculations	are	extremely	difficult	given	the	authorities’	lack	
of	transparency.	
viii	As	explained	by	Klink	and	Keivani	(2013),	even	this	distinction	does	
not	fully	explain	the	idiosyncratic	tendencies	of	spatial	development	in	
Brazil	in	the	twenty-first	century.	
ix	Whereas	President	Dilma	Rouseff	expressed	sympathy	with	the	
protestors,	Sérgio	Cabral	and	Eduardo	Paes	vehemently	attacked	them.	
x	These	examples	are	based	on	qualitative	research	carried	out	in	2013	
and	are	outlined	in	greater	depth	in	Richmond	(forthcoming).	
xi	Prices	in	peripheral	areas	have	risen	much	less	rapidly,	and	in	some	
cases	barely	at	all.	
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